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The Bhopal Disaster Litigation: It's Not Over Yet
Tim Covell*
I. Introduction
On December 3, 1984, forty tons' of deadly methyl isocyanate
gas escaped from a Union Carbide plant and spread over the city of
Bhopal, India.2 As many as 2,100 people died soon after the gas leak
and approximately 200,000 suffered injuries, 3 making it the worst in-
dustrial disaster to date.4 As of December 1990, the official death
toll reached 3,828. 5 The legal community immediately became in-
volved, filing the first suit against Union Carbide Corporation (UCC)
in the United States four days after the disaster.6 Eventually, injured
parties filed 145 lawsuits for damages against UCC in the United
States, and 6,500 against Union Carbide India, Ltd. (UCIL) in India.
7
More than 650,000 administrative personal injury claims and 7,100
administrative death claims have been filed with the Indian
government."
In the more than six years that have elapsed since the disaster,
numerous lawsuits and uncountable pages of legal documents have
been filed. Most litigation in the United States ended when the fed-
eral district court in New York dismissed the matter on the basis of
forum non conveniens.9 Litigation in India began in 1986.10
Through a court approved settlement, UCC paid $465 million" to
* Instructor, University of Toledo College of Law.
India Supreme Court Backs Carbide's Bhopal Settlement, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1989, at
A41, col 3.
2 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987).
3 Id.
4 Protests Recall Anniversary of Bhopal Deaths, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 3, 1989, at A19,
col. 4.
5 Bhopal Gas Victims Observe Sixth Anniversary of Accident, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 3,
1990, § 1, at 4. Seven hundred deaths attributed to the gas leak occurred in 1989. India
Jolts Carbide on Settlement, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 23, 1990, § 3, at 1.
6 In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 844.
7 In re Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d at 197-98.
8 Indian Town Agonizes in 5th Year Since Gas Leak, Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1989, at A34.
9 In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 845. But see infra note 197 (possible future
litigation in the United States).
10 Union of India v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 1113, (D. Bhopal, India 1986).
II All sums expressed in this Article will be in U.S. dollars, unless otherwise specified.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
the Indian Supreme Court.12 However, the government has not dis-
tributed any of the settlement money to the victims,13 and the legal
battles have not ended.14 Distribution of the settlement money will
be postponed until the Indian Supreme Court resolves all petitions
challenging the settlement.' 5 This Article focuses on the Bhopal liti-
gation in India, discusses the fairness of the settlement, and suggests
means for compensating victims more quickly in future disasters.
II. The Bhopal Plant
The disaster occurred at a chemical plant owned by the Indian
company UCIL. UCC holds 50.9% of UCIL's stock, 16 the Indian
government owns or controls 22% of the stock, and 23,000 Indian
citizens hold the remaining stock of this publicly traded company.
17
UCIL employs over 9,000 Indian nationals in fourteen plants.18 Pur-
suant to agreements signed in 1973, UCC provided a "design pack-
age"'19 to UCIL for the production of chemical fertilizers.20 UCC
warranted that the design package was the best manufacturing infor-
mation then available. 2 ' UCC provided technical services in starting
up the Bhopal plant, 22 and Indian employees were trained in the
United States in 1978 and 1979.23 Trial production began in 1980,
and a UCC employee remained at the plant until December 1982.24
At the time of the accident, Indian nationals managed and operated
the plant.2 5
12 Bhopal Funds from Carbide, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1989, at 37, col. 1. The parties
entered the settlement under authority granted by Indian legislation which gave the Indian
government the exclusive right to prosecute claims against Union Carbide. Bhopal Gas
Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act of 1985, No. 21 (India 1985), reprinted in GAZE'rrE
OF INDIA, Mar. 29, 1985 [hereinafter Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act].
13 Where Business Fell Down: After 5 Years Bhopal Victims Await Compensation, Worldpaper,
Apr. 1990, at 4.
14 Indian Shift on Bhopal Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1990, at 45, col. 5; Blum, Bhopal
Pact Critics Mull New Legislation, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 11, 1989, at 3; see infra notes 142 (possible
future criminal suits), 150 (possible future claims against the government), 166-68 (cur-
rent challenges to the settlement), 169-79 (government support for challenges to the set-
tlement) and 197 (possible future lawsuits in the United States).
15 Haunted By a Gas Cloud, TIME, Feb. 5, 1990, at 53.
16 Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, No. 26/88 (Madhya Pradesh H.C. Apr. 4,
1988) (order of Seth, J.) (the facts recited in the extensive order were gleaned from earlier
pleadings and not disputed by UCC).
17 Id.
18 In re Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d at 197.
19 The "design package" provided information about the design, fabrication, and in-
stallation of the plant and its equipment for the manufacture of methyl isocyanate. Union
Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, No. 26/88, at 17 (Madhya Pradesh H.C. Apr. 4, 1988)
(order of Seth, J.).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 18.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 In re Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d at 197.
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UCC acknowledged that the presence of a large amount of water
in a methyl isocyanate storage tank started a toxic reaction that led to
the gas leak disaster.26 UCC alleged that a disgruntled employee
hooked a water hose to the tank, intending to spoil its contents, 27 but
UCC maintained that it would never reveal the saboteur's identity.
28
The General Counsel of India countered that "[t]here's no saboteur.
It's still a hoax .... [T]he sabotage theory ... [was] an invention
based on research in the law." 29 The Indian government argued
that lax safety standards and poor plant maintenance caused the
disaster.3
0
III. The Bhopal Act
In response to the multitude of suits filed in the United States
and India seeking compensation for injuries, the Indian government
adopted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act of
1985.31 The Bhopal Act confers upon the Indian government the
power to "speedily, effectively, equitably and to the best advantage
of the claimants" handle all claims arising from the Bhopal disas-
ter.32 The Bhopal Act provides that "the Central Government shall
... have the exclusive right to represent, and act in place of (whether
within or outside of India) every person who has made, or is entitled
to make, a claim for all purposes connected with such claim in the
same manner and to the same effect as such person."'3 3 Although
the Act defines the term "claim" broadly, the definition does not in-
clude criminal matters.
34
The Bhopal Act gives claimants a limited right to legal represen-
tation.3 5 It requires the government to "have due regard to any mat-
ters which [the claimant] ... may require to be urged with respect to
26 Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, No. 26/88, at 19 (Madhya Pradesh H.C.
Apr. 4, 1988) (order of Seth, J.).
27 Bergman, Bhopak Union Carbide's Sabotage Theory, 138 NEw L.J. 420 (1988).
28 Barr, Union Carbide's Business Ethics, AM. LAw., Dec. 1989, at 16. See infra note 60
and accompanying text (discussing UCC's sabotage theory).
29 Barr, supra note 28, at 16.
30 Id.
31 The President of Parliament approved the Act on March 29, 1985. Sanu v. Union
of India, No. 258, at 15 (India Dec. 22, 1989) (writ petition).
32 Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act, supra note 12.
33 Id. at § 3.
34 The Bhopal Act defines "claim" as: "(i) a claim, arising out of, or connected with,
the disaster, for compensation or damages for any loss of life or personal injury which has
been, or is likely to be, suffered; (ii) a claim, arising out of, or connected with, the disaster,
for any damage to property which has been, or is likely to be sustained; (iii) a claim for
expenses incurred or required to be incurred for containing the disaster or mitigating or
otherwise coping with the effects of the disaster; (iv) any other claim (including claim by
way of loss of business or employment) arising out of, or connected with, the disaster." Id.
at § 2(b).
35 Id. at § 3(1).
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his claim."'3 6 It further allows a claimant to hire a legal practitioner
at his own expense to be "associated" in the conduct of any suit or
proceeding relating to the claim.3 7
The Bhopal Act authorizes the appointment of a Commissioner
to assist the government in discharging its duties under the Act.3 8
The Act grants the government the right to "form a scheme"39 to
distribute the proceeds of any settlement, to process claims, and to
create a fund to meet the government's expenses of administering
the Bhopal Act. 40 India adopted such a scheme on September 24,
1985. 4 1 The scheme provided for a Deputy Commissioner to supply
forms and to process claims for damages under the Bhopal Act.
42
Under the scheme, a claimant dissatisfied with the decision of the
Deputy Commissioner could appeal to the Commissioner appointed
pursuant to the Bhopal Act. 43 The scheme made no specific provi-
sion for judicial review.
44
IV. Initial Litigation in India
A. Criminal Litigation
In December 1984, police arrested UCC President Warren An-
derson and two senior UCIL officials in India and charged them with
criminal conspiracy, culpable homicide not amounting to murder,
causing a death by negligence, mischief in the killing of livestock,
making the atmosphere noxious to health, and negligent conduct in
respect to poisonous substances. 45 The police released Anderson on
bail a few hours after his arrest 46 and the other officials the following
36 Id. at § 4.
37 Id.
38 Id. at § 6.
39 The scheme was authorized but not required to provide for:
(a) registering claims,
(b) processing claims and securing their enforcement,
(c) maintaining records of the claims,
(d) creating a fund to meet expenses of administering the scheme,
(e) adding to the fund amounts appropriated by Parliament,
(f) disbursing settlement proceeds, and
(g) providing for ajudicial officer (of a rank not lower than a district judge) to resolve
disputes over the disbursement of funds. Id. at § 9(2).
40 The expenses of administration as of May 1989 were estimated to be $60 million.
Barr, Carbide's Escape, AM. LAw., May 1989, at 99. However, the Attorney General of India
asserted in proceedings before the Supreme Court that the government would not seek
any portion of the $470 million settlement as reimbursement for relief and rehabilitation
expenditures already made by the government for relief of gas victims. Sanu v. Union of
India, No. 258 at 11l (India Dec. 22, 1989) (writ petition).
41 Sanu, at 18-21.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 20.
44 Id. at 18-21.
45 Indians Arrest and Then Free U.S. Executive, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
46 Bail was approximately $2000. Id.
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week.47 Anderson left the jurisdiction and never returned.48 In Feb-
ruary 1988, a Bhopal magistrate issued a criminal arrest warrant
naming UCC President Warren Anderson, UCC, UCIL, Union Car-
bide of Hong Kong, and other officials of Carbide in its various
forms.4 9 Eventually the Indian government filed four criminal ac-
tions against UCC and its officials. 50 However, various summonses
and arrest warrants failed to bring Anderson back within India's ju-
risdiction, and in February 1989 an Indian magistrate declared An-
derson an "absconding offender. '' 51 To date, none of the criminal
actions have been brought to trial.
B. Civil Litigation
India's adoption of the Bhopal Act effectively terminated the
6,500 civil suits initially filed in India.52 As representative of the vic-
tims, the Indian government concentrated its efforts on the consoli-
dated suit filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. 53 However, the district court dismissed this
action on the basis of forum non conveniens. 54 India then filed suit
against UCC as sole defendant in Bhopal, India in September
1986.5 5 India's complaint advanced the new theory of multinational
47 India Frees Two Carbide Officials, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1984, at A4, col. 4.
48 The Indian government released Anderson on the stipulation that he leave the
country. Indians Arrest and Then Free U.S. Executive, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1984, at AI, col. 2.
There are no reports that Anderson returned to India.
49 Sanu v. Union of India, No. 258, at 9-10 (India Dec. 22, 1989) (writ petition).
Among the actions alleged to have led to the disaster were:
1. failing to store the methyl isocyanate gas in stainless steel containers;
2. needlessly storing large quantities of gas in large containers for inordinate time
periods;
3. insufficient caution in designing and constructing the plant and its systems, and
inadequate control of storage systems;
4. a lack of necessary facilities for quick and effective disposal of unstable materials;
5. storing methyl isocyanate gas in a negligent manner; and
6. failing to inform the local government of the hazardousness of the gas and the
medical steps to be taken after exposure. Id.
50 Summons in Bhopal Case, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1988, at D2, col. 4.
51 Bhopal Court Declaration, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1989, at AI, col. 2.
52 See supra note 7 (6,500 suits filed against UCIL in India).
53 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987).
54 Id. See Nanda, For Whom the Bell Tolls in the Aftermath of the Bhopal Tragedy: Reflection
on Forum Non Conveniens and Alternative Methods of Resolving the Bhopal Dispute, 15 DEN.J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 235 (1987) (discussing forum non conveniens dismissal and modification on
appeal).
55 Union of India v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 1113 (D. Bhopal, India 1986).
The Indian judicial system, unlike that of the United States, does not have a dual
system of state and federal courts. The highest authority is the supreme court, and below
it are the high courts of each state, and below these are the subordinate courts, including
the district courts. Jain,judicial System and Legal Remedies, in THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 133
(Minattur ed. 1978).
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VoL. 16
enterprise liability,5 6 claiming that UCC, as a multinational corpora-
tion engaged in an ultrahazardous activity, had "an absolute and
non-delegable duty to ensure that the . . .hazardous plant did not
cause any danger or damage to the people and the State by the oper-
ation of the ultrahazardous and dangerous activity at the . . .
plant." T57 Under this theory, the complex nature of a multinational
enterprise makes pinpointing responsibility for damage caused by its
subsidiaries impossible. As a single monolithic entity, only the en-
terprise can guard against its hazards, and it alone should be held
responsible for the injuries it causes. 58 In its answer, UCC denied
the existence of this theory of recovery and stressed UCIL's indepen-
dence, 59 the government's regulation and ownership of UCIL, and
the saboteur theory. 60
India's multinational enterprise liability theory is premised on
56 Complaint at 20, Union of India v. Union Carbide Corp., No.1 113 (D. Bhopal,
India 1986).
57 Id.
58 The complaint alleged:
Persons harmed by the acts of the multinational corporation are not in a
position to isolate which unit of the enterprise caused the harm, yet it is evi-
dent that the multinational that caused the harm is liable for such harm. The
defendant multinational corporation has to bear this responsibility for it
alone had at all material times the means to know and guard against the
hazards likely to be caused by the operation of the said plant, designed and
installed or cause to be installed by it and to provide warnings of the poten-
tial hazards.
Id. at 19.
59 Stanley Chesley, plaintiffs' attorney in the United States action, claims that discov-
ery revealed that UCC exerted direct control over UCIL. He wrote:
[T]he actions and documents of Union Carbide belie the notion that Union
Carbide dealt with UCIL at arms length. First, Union Carbide controlled the
UCIL board through its subsidiary Union Carbide Eastern, Ltd. (UCE). Sec-
ond, Union Carbide organized its reporting function so that there were dual
lines of authority. One ran along normal corporate lines, that is from UCIL
to UCE to UCC. The other ran across business lines, that is all agricultural
products businesses throughout the world reported to. Union Carbide Agri-
cultural Products, Inc. (UPAC), another wholly owned UCC subsidiary. This
latter reporting scheme provided the direct control over UCIL's Bhopal
plant.
Chesley, Management of Compkx Mass Tort Litigation: Strategy and Tactics, Settlement and Attor-
ney Fees, 306 PRAc. L. INsT. 455, 464. Additionally, UCC held over fifty percent of the stock
of UCIL and was able to elect its board of directors and to control its management. Union
Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, No. 26/88, at 91-92 (Madhya Pradesh H.C. Apr. 4, 1988)
(order of Seth, J.).
60 Defendant's Written Statement and Set-off and Counterclaim, Union of India v.
Union Carbide Corp., No. 1113 (D. Bhopal, India, 1986). UCC's sabotage theory would
provide a complete defense under the traditional Anglo-American rule of strict liability,
and Indian tort law is founded upon English tort law. Muchlinski, The Bhopal Case: Control-
ling Ultrahazardous Industrial Activities Undertaken By Foreign Investors, 50 MoD. L. REV. 545,
564-75 (1987). Under Anglo-American rules, the occupier of premises is held strictly lia-
ble for damage caused by a dangerous thing escaping due to a non-natural use of land
unless the escape was caused by a stranger. Bergman, supra note 27, at 420; see Rylands v.
Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (seminal English case); Muchlinski, supra (summarizing
then-applicable tort law).
India's multinational enterprise liability theory, however, would avoid the sabotage
defense by holding UCC to an absolute and non-delegable duty to prevent damage or
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the. enterprise liability theory established in M. C. Metha v. Union of
India.6 1 The Metha case involved a 1985 gas leak at a chlorine manu-
facturing plant in Delhi, India.62 The victims filed for relief before
the Indian Supreme Court, and a panel of five justices held that,
where an enterprise engages in a hazardous or inherently dangerous
activity and anyone is harmed by the activity, the enterprise is strictly
and absolutely liable to compensate all those affected by the acci-
dent.63 The Metha court found it "necessary to construct a new prin-
ciple of liability to deal with an unusual situation which ha[d] arisen
• . . on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries
which are concomitant to an industrial economy." 64 Metha also intro-
duced a punitive element into calculating damages; the court said
that "the measure of compensation . . . must be correlated to the
magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation
must have a deterrent effect. The larger and more prosperous the
enterprise, greater must be the amount of compensation payable. ' '65
Applying Metha to the Bhopal case, in order to establish UCC's liabil-
ity India only needed to prove that UCIL conducted an ul-
trahazardous activity, that people were harmed, and that UCC
controlled UCIL.
V. Pressures for Resolution
By early 1987, more than two years had elapsed since the Bho-
pal disaster, and no compensation had been paid to the Bhopal vic-
injury. Complaint at 20, Union of India v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 1113 (D. Bhopal,
India 1986).
Even if sabotage were the cause and the multinational theory failed, there still may
have been grounds to hold UCC liable for its design and setup of the facility. All five of
the Bhopal gas plant's major safety systems had to fail simultaneously to produce a disas-
ter of this magnitude, according to Fred Millar of the Environmental Policy Institute's
Toxic Chemicals Safety and Health Project. India: U.S. Experts Denounce Bhopal Settlement as
a "Sell-Out", Inter Press Service, Feb. 23, 1989.
61 Metha v. Union of India, [1987] A.I.R.(S.C.) 1086.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1099.
64 Id.
65 Id. Whether the current Indian Supreme Court approves of the concept of puni-
tive damages is open to question. ChiefJustice Mukharji, in his opinion in Sanu v. Union of
India, said in dicta:
There are, however, serious difficulties in evolving an actual concept of puni-
tive damages in respect of a civil action which can be integrated and enforced
by the judicial process. It would have raised serious problems of pleading,
proof and discovery, and interesting and challenging as the task may have
been, it is still very uncertain how far [a] decision based on such a concept
would have been a decision according to 'due process' of law acceptable by
international standards.
Sanu v. Union of India, No. 258, at 133 (India Dec. 22, 1989) (writ petition).
Justices Ranganathan and Ahmadi agreed with the ChiefJustice that punitive damages
were an "uncertain province of the law" and felt it premature to conclude that punitive
damages had been, or would be accepted in India. Id. at 21-22 (Ranganathan and Ahmadi,
JJ., concurring).
1991]
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tims. 6 6 This elapsed time pressured the Indian government to
resolve the case. The delays were compounded when Presiding
Judge Patel, who originally had promised to resolve the case by the
end of 1987, requested a transfer from the case after learning his
name appeared on a list of claimants for damages caused by the dis-
aster.67 His removal, noted one observer, increased pressure on the
Indian government to settle the case.
68
By presenting the multinational enterprise liability theory, attor-
neys for the Indian government hoped simply to prove that: (1) a
dangerous activity was under way at Bhopal; (2) people were
harmed; and (3) UCC controlled UCIL. 69 The government moved
for summary judgment on this theory; however, the court never
heard the motion.70 Instead, Judge Deo, who replaced Judge Patel,
sua sponte ordered the Attorney General to submit a written propo-
sal for interim relief.7 ' On December 17, 1987, Judge Deo ordered
UCC to pay $270 million in interim relief within two months.
72
UCC appealed the order to the Madhya Pradesh High Court
where Justice Seth upheld the grant of relief, but reduced its amount
to $190 million.73 Justice Seth held that the lower court could grant
interim relief under the common law of torts. 74 Justice Seth noted
the similarity between the facts of the UCC case and the Metha case,
and applied the Metha rule of absolute liability without exceptions.
75
Justice Seth said that Metha eliminated the exceptions to strict liabil-
ity that had existed previously under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.
76
Under the Metha absolute liability rule, the court reasoned, the enter-
prise engaged in the ultrahazardous activity that led to injury was
66 See supra note 13. There is a backlog of 10 million cases in India's courts and the
average civil case takes more than eleven years to try. Bhopal May Join List; 10 Million Cases
Await Indian Justice, L.A. Times, June 3, 1986, § 1, at 10, col. 3. In 1985, UCC Chairman
Warren Anderson felt the litigation could take from six to nine years, while plaintiff's
attorney Michael Ciresi predicted 25 years. Mr. Ciresi said UCC wanted the suit litigated
in India because Indian justice moves so slowly. Legal Wrangling Delays Bhopal Compensation,
Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 1985, at AI.
67 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 97 (Mar. 11, 1987).
68 An Indian daily newspaper commented, "This development has raised once again
the question of whether interests of the gas leak victims would be better served by the
government of India having an out of court settlement with Union Carbide." Id. at 3
(quoting THE STATESMAN, Feb. 21, 1987).
69 Barr, supra note 40, at 99, 101.
70 Id.
71 Judge Deo was inspired by an earlier motion of an activist attorney injured during
the Bhopal disaster. Id. at 100-01.
72 Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, No. 13080, at 12 (India 1988) (special
leave petition).
73 Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, No. 26/88, at 99-100 (Madhya Pradesh
H.C. Apr. 4, 1988) (order of Seth, J.).
74 Id. at 88-102.
75 Id. at 79-80.
76 Id. at 80 (citing Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868)). See Muchlinski, supra
note 60, and sources cited therein.
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liable for the resulting damages. 77
In justifying the grant of interim relief, Justice Seth analogized
to English law, which allows interim orders for damages in certain
circumstances. 78 justice Seth incorporated the English rule into the
common law of India, with the requirements that: (1) if the action
proceeded to trial the plaintiff would obtain judgment for substantial
damages; and (2) the payor is (a) insured in respect of plaintiff's
claims, (b) a public authority, or (c) a person whose means and re-
sources are such as to enable him to make the interim payment.
79
The case against UCC met all of these requirements.
80
The Madhya Pradesh High Court upheld the district court's
"lifting of the corporate veil" of UCIL and held UCC liable for the
operations of UCIL.8' The court said that legal grounds for lifting
the corporate veil had been expanding82 and that it could be lifted
on purely equitable considerations in the case of a mass disaster
when the assets of a subsidiary were utterly insufficient to meet the
just claims of the victims. 8 3 The court also considered that UCC
held more than one-half of the voting power of UCIL, enabling it to
elect the board of directors and to control the management.8 4 The
court concluded that UCC "had real control over the enterprise
which was engaged in carrying on the particular hazardous and in-
herently dangerous industry at the Bhopal plant and as such [UCC]
was absolutely liable (without exceptions) to pay dam-
ages/compensation to the multitude of gas victims." 8 5 The court re-
duced the amount of interim compensation ordered by the lower
court to an amount it calculated as one-half of the reasonable com-
pensation for the estimated number of injured people.8 6 Justice Seth
77 Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, No. 26/88, at 81 (Madhya Pradesh H.C.
Apr. 4, 1988) (order of Seth, J.).
78 Id. at 82-83.
79 Id. at 86-87.
80 Id. at 87-88. Earlier in the case, UCC filed an affidavit which revealed it had ade-
quate resources to make the interim payment. See infra notes 81-85 (establishing UCC's
liability).
81 Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, No. 26/88, at 91 (Madhya Pradesh H.C.
Apr. 4, 1988) (order of Seth, J.).
82 Justice Seth quoted the Indian Supreme Court's decision in Life Ins. Corp. of India
v. Escorts Ltd.,[1986] A.I.R. (S.C.) 1370 which said:
The corporate veil may be lifted where a statute itself contemplates lifting the
veil, or fraud or improper conduct is intended to be prevented or a taxing
statute or benevolent statute is sought to be evaded or where associated compa-
nies are inextricably connected as to be in reality part of one concern. It is neither neces-
sary nor desirable to enumerate the class of cases where the lifting [of] the veil is
permissible, since, that must necessarily depend on the relevant statutory or other provi-
sions, the objects sought to be achieved, the impugned conduct, the involvement of the
element of public interest, [and] the effect on parties who may be affected ....
Id. at 90 (emphasis in original).
83 Id. at 88-91.
84 Id. at 91-93.
85 Id. (parentheticals in original).
86 Id. at 98. Justice Seth first considered the size and value of UCC under the Metha
1991]
288 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 16
offered little explanation for his choice of the overall sum; he simply
found it to be a reasonable portion of the damages to be recovered
by the plaintiff.
87
A UCC official reportedly said there "was no way in hell" that
UCC would pay the interim compensation without a final, unappeal-
able order.88 Attorneys for the Indian government expressed dis-
comfort with the interim relief order, but were obligated to argue for
it due to the political exigencies, of the situation.89 Furthermore, it
was doubtful that the order could be enforced against UCC in Amer-
ican courts.9 0
Because India considers its image in the international arena to
be important, its desire to avoid another review in the United States
courts may have encouraged it to settle the matter. While the Bho-
pal case was pending in the United States courts, counsel for India
argued that Indian courts could not justly compensate the victims of
the Bhopal disaster.9 ' The High Court of India took strong excep-
tion to this characterization. Justice Seth said, "this Court cannot
precedent. He then accepted the allegations of India's amended complaint that 2,500 had
died and 30,000 were seriously injured. Justice Seth divided the claims into four catego-
ries, and declared just compensation for the categories to be:
a. $12,100 for death,
b. $12,100 for total disability,
c. $6,050 for permanent partial disability, and
d. $3,025 for temporary partial disability.
He awarded half ($190 million) of this total sum as interim relief. The Supreme Court
of India, in reaching an appropriate sum for settlement in February 1989, apparently re-
lied somewhat upon these figures. Sanu v. Union of India, No. 258, at 117 (India Dec. 22,
1989) (writ petition); Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, No. 13080, at 11-18 (India
1988) (special leave petition) (reciting the basis for the sum the Supreme Court ordered
UCC to pay in settlement of the litigation).
87 Id. at 96-99.
88 Barr, supra note 40, at 101.
89 Id. The lawyers for the Indian government had hoped to establish liability through
summary judgment, according to one of the lawyers, Mr. Sastri. Id. However, they had to
promote the interim order because not to do so would have been politically devastating
for their client, the Indian government, whose judges had ordered the interim relief. Id.
at 101-02. "We had no choice but to argue the matter," Sastri said. Id.
90 Id. New York University international law expert Andre Lowenfeld felt it was ques-
tionable whether United States courts would enforce the interim order, because the For-
eign Judgment Act provides only for enforcing final orders. Stille, A Sense of Dharma; Union
Carbide Faces Duty, Hindu-Styk, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 29, 1988, at 1, 44. Further, even if it were a
final order, United States courts could not enforce the judgment if it violated due process.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 482(l)(a)
(1987). The courts could decline to enforce ajudgment that violated the public policy of
the jurisdiction. Id. at § 482(2)(d). Even if the Indian judgment were enforceable in the
United States, one expert estimated, it would have been five or ten years before the plain-
tiffs could obtain UCC assets. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at D3, col. 1.
91 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
aff'd as modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987). Among other
things, counsel for India contended that the Indian Judiciary:
1. Lacked innovation
2. Suffered from endemic delays
3. Lacked the procedural capacity to deal with the case because of:
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restrain itself from expressing shock over the manner in which ...
the plaintiff Union of India under-rated its own judiciary and made it
the subject of ridicule so publicly before a foreign court."'92 The In-
dian government's desire to avoid further review by the United
States courts, and perhaps the United States courts' refusal to en-
force an Indian judgment, 93 made the prospect of settlement more
attractive.9
4
Both UCC and the Indian government appealed Justice Seth's
decision to the Indian Supreme Court. The Indian government ar-
gued that the amount of interim relief awarded should not have been
reduced. 95 These appeals set the stage for more delays in compen-
sating the disaster victims. Hearings began before the Indian
Supreme Court on November 1, 1988.96 Settlement talks were revi-
talized by India's desire to avoid further delays and by UCC's desire
to be done with the matter.
97
In previous settlement negotiations, UCC consistently offered
$350 million paid over ten years. 98 On January 1, 1989, UCC of-
fered $240 million in a lump sum, but a few days later it reduced the
offer to $150 million.99 The Indian government demanded at least
a $615 million lump-sum payment. 00 On February 3, UCC offered
a. small law firms,
b. unsophisticated tort law,
c. inadequate discovery,
d. lack of juries,
e. lack of contingency fees,
f. potential unenforceability of a judgment rendered by the Indian courts against
UCC. Id. at 848-52.
92 The court continued:
Indeed, before this Court, during the course of arguments, the learned At-
torney General, Shri Parasaran, frankly confessed that it was most unfortu-
nate that the plaintiff Union of India chose to advance such an argument
before a foreign court as had the effect of tarnishing the fair image of the
Indian judiciary.
Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, No.26/88, at 8-9 (Madhya Pradesh H.C. Apr.4,
1988) (order of Seth, J.).
93 All four of India's trial counsel, as well as the Minister of State for Law and Justice,
expressed doubt that the interim relief order would be upheld in American courts. Barr,
supra note 40, at 102.
94 India was hesitant to press the matter in the United States for fear of losing due
process arguments, and because the interim order might not be a final judgment enforcea-
ble under the Foreign Judgments Act. Stille, supra note 90. See supra notes 88-90. Even if
India were successful in the United States courts, more than five years would have elapsed
before India obtained any of UCC's assets. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at D3, col. 1. Set-
tlement would avoid these problems. However, UCC also felt pressure to settle. Former
plaintiff's attorney Aaron Broder said UCC was beginning to face the potential for a guar-
anteed loss and perhaps a catastrophic one. Neither UCC nor India wanted to risk losing
in the United States courts. Stille, supra note 90.
95 Barr, supra note 40, at 102.
96 Id.
97 See supra note 94.
98 Barr, supra note 40, at 102.
99 Id.
1OO Id.
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$350 million over time, and on February 4, UCC offered $420 mil-
lion in a lump sum.101 The Indian government counter-offered at
$600 million and said that it would not consider any amount less
than $500 million. 10 2 The Indian Supreme Court, in a May 1989
order analyzing the eventual settlement, said UCC's highest offer
was $426 million and the lowest government offer was $500
million.
103
VI. The Bhopal Settlement
The facts behind the February 14, 1989, settlement are unclear;
however, the following account has emerged. On February 14,
Supreme Court Chief Justice Pathak ordered a "settlement" com-
pensation payment of $470 million. 10 4 Both parties immediately
agreed to the deal, which caused allegations of a "stage managed"
settlement, engineered to alleviate criticism of the Indian govern-
ment for settling the matter by adding the judiciary's imprimatur to
the deal.' 05 One Indian lawyer commented, "There's no question
about it, the settlement was sprung. Obviously talks were going on.
You can't arrive at a settlement like that on a particular day, [with]
the histrionics of Mr. Nariman, counsel for Carbide-'Standing here
as I do, my client bows to the wishes of the highest court in the land,'
and his client accepts it, and the Attorney General agrees .... It's
absurd." 106 Judicial initiative apparently played some role in the set-
tlement;' 0 7 however, UCC directors were polled about the settle-
ment before the matter was publicly presented by the court, 10 8
showing that behind-the-scenes negotiations were in progress.
In response to these allegations, the Indian Ministry of Informa-
tion and Broadcasting issued a ten page information release.' 0 9 An-
swering the question of whether the event was a settlement or court
order, the information release stated that the court's order "makes it
abundantly clear" that the judges found the $470 million settlement
"just, equitable and reasonable." The release continued, "It should
be remembered that the government made several attempts and
failed to arrive at an out of court settlement .... [A]ll attempts failed
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, No. 13080, at 11 (India 1988) (special
leave petition).
104 Bhopal Payments by Union Carbide Set at $470 Million, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at
Al, col. 6.
105 Id.; Barr, supra note 40, at 102-04.
106 Barr, supra note 40, at 104 (quoting Soli Sorabjee).
107 Reportedly, before the settlement the chiefjustice placed the other justices hear-
ing the case into pairs and asked them to independently determine a fair settlement figure.
Both pairs came up with figures in the $450 million range, which were rounded up to
approximately 7 billion rupees or $470 million. Id.
108 Id.
109 Barr, supra note 40, at 102-04.
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and it was ultimately left to the Supreme Court to make a figure and
pass an order." 110
On May 4, 1989, the Supreme Court issued an order explaining
its reasons for adopting the February 14, 1989, settlement."' The
court's main consideration was its compelling duty, both judicial and
humane, to provide immediate relief to the victims."l 2 The court
recognized the desirability of litigating the matter and setting judicial
precedent in such a disaster; however, the pressing needs of the vic-
tims overrode the desire for judicial precedent." 3 In arriving upon
an appropriate sum for settlement, the court considered the esti-
mated numbers of injured people and chose a sum that was more
than three times the amount that would have been statutorily
granted to automobile accident victims.1
14
The settlement brought an immediate public outcry."15 Public
criticism forced Supreme Court Justice Venkataramiah to withdraw
from the case." 6 Former Supreme Court Justice V.R. Krishna at-
tacked the settlement as a "sinister surrender" to UCC. 1 7 In de-
nouncing the settlement he said: "The central government's conduct
of the litigation, regardless of their bona fides, was the worst legal
disaster .... Is Indian life so cheap, Indian justice so weak that a U.S.
multinational trading in lethal gas can blackmail the managers of our
republic into bending before them?" 118 Similarly, retired Indian
Supreme Court Chief Justice Bhagwati said in a magazine interview,
"the multinational has won and the people of India have lost.""19
Presiding Indian Supreme Court ChiefJustice Pathak commented, "I
want to make it clear that we did the best that could be done under
the facts and circumstances of the case. But we shall be happy to
repair if any error is shown."' 20
The settlement eliminated all criminal and civil claims against
10 Id. at 102.
111 Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, No. 13080 (India 1988) (special leave
petition).
112 Id. at 5-7.
113 Id. at 20-24.
''4 Id. at 12-19.
115 Tarrant, Union Carbide Seen as Victor in Bhopal Disaster Settlement, Reuter Libr. Rep.,
Feb. 19, 1989. The head of the New York based Bhopal Action Resource Center, David
Dembo, called the settlement "totally scandalous." India: U.S. Experts Denounce Bhopal
Settlement as a "Sell-Out", Inter Press Service, Feb. 23, 1989. He said, "The Indian govern-
ment did not have any hopes of getting a decent settlement in the near future, and there-
fore they accepted the (smaller) amount. They sold out." Id.
116 Justice Venkataramiah said, "You take any newspaper. We are being impeached
every day. All sorts of things are spoken of us. No one speaks for us. The best is to
withdraw from the case .... I want to withdraw and live peacefully at this state in my life."
Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 113 (Mar. 8, 1989).
117 Retired Judge Criticizes Bhopal Settlement, Reuter Libr. Rep., Apr. 15, 1989.
118 Id.
119 Justice Bhagwati retired from the Indian'Supreme Court in December 1986. India:
Supreme Court May Not Revise Settlement, Inter Press Service, Mar. 9, 1989.
120 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 113 (Mar. 8, 1989).
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UCC.121 Some critics strongly argued that the bargaining away of
criminal liability is unauthorized by the Bhopal Act. 122 Retired In-
dian Supreme Court Chief Justice Bhagwati remarked, "It defies
comprehension how criminal proceedings against Union Carbide
Corporation's officers can be quashed without even examining if
there is a prima facie case. Can immunity from prosecution be
bought by paying compensation?"' 2 3 However, the Indian Attorney
General explained that the discharge of criminal liability was made
within the broad powers of the Supreme Court bench, not in the way
of settlement. '
2 4
On February 24, 1989, UCC paid $465 million to the Indian
government, twenty-nine days before it was due. 125 The court
credited UCC for a prior. $5 million payment that UCC had made to
the Red Cross. UCIL paid $45 million of the total settlement.'
26
The government deposited the money into an Indian Supreme Court
account, where it remains pending resolution of all challenges to the
settlement. 
2 7
121 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 164-65 (Apr. 13, 1989).
122 Bhopal activist Vinod Raina of the Bhopal Group for Information and Action said,
"By agreeing to drop the criminal charges, the government has allowed the guilty off and
the killer multinational to go scot-free." Tarrant, Union Carbide Seen as Victor in Bhopal
Disaster Settlement, Reuter Libr. Rep., Feb. 19, 1989.
123 India: Supreme Court May Not Revise Settlement, Inter Press Service, Mar. 9, 1989.
124 Id. See infra note 142. The Indian Code of Civil Procedure provides, "Nothing in
this code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the court to
make such orders as may be necessary for the ends ofjustice." Stille, supra note 90, at 1,
43 (quoting the INDIAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE).
125 Bhopal Funds from Carbide, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1989, at 37, col. 1.
126 Supra note 121.
127 See Blum, supra note 14, at 3, 26. There have been other related suits. In October
1989, the Supreme Court of India ordered UCC to respond to charges by workers that
UCC had experimented on its employees with lethal gases. L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1989, part
4, at 2, col. 1. UCC responded that the allegation is absurd. Id. The workers, however,
claim to quote from a memo sent from UCC headquarters in Connecticut that indicates
tests were conducted on 12 employees without their knowledge, and that the employees
were referred to as "volunteers." Bhopal, United Press Int'l, Oct. 4, 1989.
Indian tax authorities in July 1989 demanded payment from interest earned on the
$470 million settlement fund paid by UCC. The sum has been deposited in the court's
register pending legal challenges and is earning interest at a rate of about $130,000 a day.
Indian Taxman Eyes Compensation for Bhopal Victims, Reuter Libr. Rep., July 17, 1989. The
Indian Attorney General says he will fight to prevent any of the money falling into the
hands of the tax service. Id.
A Texas court dismissed a case filed by Washington, D.C. public interest lawyer Rob
Hager in an unpublished February opinion. India: U.S. Experts Denounce Bhopal Settlement as
a "Sell-Out", Inter Press Service, Feb. 23, 1989. Hager had hoped to relitigate the forum
non conveniens dismissal in another forum. Hager is considering filing a similar suit in
California. Blum, supra note 14.
American attorneys F. Lee Bailey and Stanley Chesley, on behalf of the plaintiffs' law-
yers executive committee, petitioned the New York District Court for costs incurred in the
United States portion of the suit. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, Misc. No.
21-38 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1989) (1989 WL 66637). The court denied the motion, noting
that the appellate court decision had, "in broad and sweeping strokes swept away the no-
tion that this court retained any vestige of jurisdiction after the forum non conveniens
dismissal." Id. See Nanda, supra note 54 (discussing forum non conveniens dismissal).
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Upon reaching the settlement, the Indian government promised
that the money would be disbursed "impartially, speedily, and effec-
tively.' 128 In April 1989, an estimated one person per day was dying
from the effects of the gas, but only four survivors of the disaster had
been identified as permanently and totally disabled. 129 This
prompted the Supreme Court to order the payment of token interim
relief of $35 per month to the four, and a lump sum payment of $200
to 773 others.'5 0
In May 1989, the Indian government gave bank account books
to twenty-five of 1,609 relatives of those injured in the Bhopal disas-
ter in anticipation of the disbursement of a, $50 interim payment to
be made by the government.' 3 ' By August 1989, the Indian govern-
ment classified only nineteen of more than 120,000 claimants ex-
amined as permanently disabled.' 3
2
On March 5, 1990, the Indian government announced it would
distribute $12 per month for three years to each of 500,000 people
who were exposed to the gas.13 3 The government hopes that within
three years all pending court cases arising from the disaster will be
resolved.' 3 4 A government spokesperson 'declared that the distribu-
tion would be made to the unusually large group 3 5 because all per-
sons exposed to the gas would suffer, even though the effects might
only show up years later. The funds will not initially come from the
settlement paid by UCC. Instead, the government has set aside $212
million to make the payments. '3 6 The expenditure will be "adjusted
against" any recovery the victims may get in the current litigation.13 7
As of December 1990, the government was paying monthly compen-
sation to 372,000 Bhopal victims.' 3 8
VII. The Constitutionality of the Bhopal Act
In December 1989, the Indian Supreme Court upheld the con-
The court, however, complimented the attorneys on their professionalism. Id. On appeal,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held the lawyers should file for their fees in India's
courts. Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1991).
128 Bhopal Victims to Get Income for Life, India Says, Reuter Libr. Rep., Feb. 23, 1989.
129 Court Awards Pensions to Four Bhopal Victims, Reuter Libr. Rep., Apr. 28, 1989.
130 Id.
131 Distribution of Interim Relief to Bhopal Gas Victims Starts, Reuter Libr. Rep., May 9,
1989.
132 Barr, supra note 28.
133 India Sets Plan to Distribute $200 Million to Gas Victims, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1990, at
D9, col. 1.
'S4 Payouts in Bhopal are Going Slowly, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1990, at A2, col. 1.
135 See infra note 203.
136 See supra note 133. It is not clear if the government hopes to recover the full
amount from the potential recovery, or whether granting compensation will affect deci-
sions about damages under the "scheme" to distribute the settlement proceeds. See infra
note 204 and accompanying text.
137 See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
138 Bhopal Gas Disaster Still Plagues Survivors, Reuter Libr. Rep., Dec. 2, 1990.
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stitutionality of the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing Claims)
Act of 1985 which authorized the government to enter into the set-
tlement on behalf of the Bhopal victims. 139 The decision was ren-
dered by the new Chief Justice appointed under newly elected Prime
Minister V.P. Singh. 140 The lengthy opinion14 1 contained far-reach-
ing language, although the specific question addressed was only
whether the Bhopal Act was constitutional, not whether the settle-
ment itself was fair or should be upheld.' 42
The petitioners' main contention was that the Bhopal Act, inso-
far as it took away the ability of the victims to fight for their rights,
denied them access to justice. 143 However, the Chief Justice found
that the Bhopal Act provided a special procedure for protecting the
rights of the victims which, in light of the circumstances, was justi-
fied. He said that in view of the enormity of the disaster, the fact that
the victims were facing a mighty multinational and were being de-
scended upon by contingency fee lawyers was a sufficient ground to
provide a special procedure that was just and fair, and that this pro-
cedure did not violate the Indian Constitution. 144
The Chief Justice said the government adopted the Bhopal Act
in recognition of the right of a sovereign to act as parens patriae. 45
He continued,
where the citizens of a country are victims of a tragedy because of
139 Sanu v. Union of India, No. 258 (India Dec. 22, 1989) (writ petition). ChiefJustice
Mukharji was joined in his opinion by Justice Saikai. Justices Ranganathan and Ahmadi
joined in a concurrence, and Justice Singh filed a separate concurrence.
140 Carbide's Settlement is Upheld, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 23, 1989, § 2, at 9. Chandra
Shekhar replaced Mr. Singh as Prime Minister in November 1990. See infra note 179.
141 The decision of the Indian Supreme Court consisted of a 185 page majority opin-
ion and concurrences totalling 54 pages. Sanu v. Union of India, No. 258 (India Dec. 22,
1989) (writ petition).
142 Id. As a preliminary matter, the court clarified that the Bhopal Act did not address
the question of criminal liability, and that the discharge of criminal charges by the Indian
Supreme Court was not before it in this case. Both the petitioners and the Indian Attorney
General agreed on this position. Id. at 35, 63.
The Attorney General said the discharge of criminal liability was authorized under
sections 135 and 142 of the Indian constitution as well as under common law, and that the
discharge was further permitted under the plenary power of the supreme court to act as a
court of equity. Id. at 109-10.
Although the court did not rule on this issue as it was beyond the scope of the appeal,
it seems a well orchestrated reopening of the criminal case would serve the interests of the
Indian government. The honor of the Indian judiciary and judicial support for commer-
cial and industrial development in India could be maintained by upholding the settlement.
But at the same time, the government and the people of India could vent their wrath in a
criminal prosecution of executives who are beyond the reach of the courts. For example,
before the criminal charges were dismissed in the settlement, India attempted to serve an
arrest warrant on then UCC Chairman Anderson, but was unable to do so because the
warrant was not covered by U.S. laws of international judicial assistance. The same thing
happened with warrants for the arrest of Union Carbide Eastern officials in Hong Kong.
Briefly, L.A. Times, Jan. 9, 1989, § 4, at 2, col. 1.
143 Sanu v. Union of India, No. 258, at 135 (India Dec. 22, 1989) (writ petition).
144 Id. at 137-38.
145 Id. at 81.
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the negligence of a multinational corporation, a peculiar situation
arises which calls for suitable effective machinery to articulate and
effectuate the grievance and demands of the victims, for which the
conventional adversary system would be totally inadequate. The
state in discharge of its sovereign obligation must come forward. 
1 46
The court further explained that "[t]he State has taken over the
rights of the victims in the exercise of sovereignty in order to dis-
charge the constitutional obligations as the parent and guardian of
the victims who in the situation as placed needed the umbrella of
protection." 1
4 7
The court noted that the doctrine of parens patriae traditionally
required that the group for whom the state acted be disabled. The
unique circumstances of the Bhopal disaster provided the disability
in this case. 148 The court did not apply the doctrine of parens patriae
strictly; it commented that the Bhopal Act was an appropriate evolu-
tion of the expression of the sovereignty of the state.'
49
In response to the petitioners' allegations of a conflict of interest
because the government of India was a shareholder in UCIL, the
court replied that the suit was against UCC only, and that the Bhopal
Act and the settlement did not affect any future claims that might be
brought against the government of India and the state govern-
ment.' 50 Therefore, the court reasoned that there was no conflict of
interest. Even if the government of India were a joint tortfeasor, its
interest in the litigation against UCC-to have the largest amount of
monetary liability attributed to UCC-would still be compatible with
the victims' financial interests.151 Furthermore, even if there were a
conflict of interest, India was the most suitable party to bring the suit
based upon the common law doctrine of necessity.152
The petitioners argued that the Bhopal Act violated the concept
146 Id. at 81-82. Parens patriae means "literally 'parent of the country,' [and] refers
traditionally to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal
disability.... It is a concept of standing utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign interests
such as health, comfort and welfare of the people." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed.
1979).
W Sanu v. Union of India, No. 258, at 156.
148 The court said the victims after the disaster were physically, mentally, financially,
and economically not a match for the powerful multinational company. Id. at 140.
149 Id. at 142.
150 Id. at 150-51. This declaration may set the stage for even more litigation.
One petitioner argued that the negligence of the Indian government included:
1. allowing the factory to be installed in the heart of the city,
2. allowing people to live in front of the factory, knowing that dangerous
gases were being used in the manufacturing process,
3. realizing gas leakage from the plant was a common event which was com-
plained about continuously by the people.
Id. at 70-71 (Dec. 22, 1989).
151 Id. at 19 (Ranganathan and Ahmadi, JJ. concurring).
152 The court applied by analogy the common law doctrine of necessity, borrowed
from British law. Under that doctrine, if all members of a tribunal are disqualified from
hearing a matter because of a conflict of interest, the lack of an alternative forum will
oblige the court to hear the matter anyway. Id. at 167-68.
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of "natural justice."'15 Under Indian law, the principle of natural
justice "requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that
decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings
that effect their lives and property should not continue in their ab-
sence and that they should not be precluded from participating in
them." 154 The court interpreted the Bhopal Act as providing the in-
jured with an opportunity to state their positions before the govern-
ment reached any settlement.' 5 5 However, the court said the
concept of natural justice also required notice to be given to the
claimants before the government reached a settlement.156 This no-
tice was not given to the Bhopal victims.' 5 7 The court opined that
justice had been done to the victims, but because they lacked input,
justice did not appear to have been done.15 8 This failure to give no-
tice, however, was not fatal because, "to do a great right after all, it is
permissible to do a little wrong. In the facts and circumstances of
this case, this is one of those rare occasions."'
15 9
In interpreting the Bhopal Act, the court added a new require-
ment that categorization of claims and decisions of the Deputy Com-
missioner under the scheme be appealable to a judicial authority.' 60
The court also called for swift disbursement of the settlement pro-
ceeds to the victims.' 6 ' So modified, the Indian Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of the Bhopal Act.
Far reaching dicta in the decision hinted at the court's likely pos-
ture in future hearings on the fairness of the settlement. The Chief
Justice noted that the disaster victims received justice, but because of
the failure to allow them input, justice did not appear to be done. To
remedy this injustice, the settlement funds should be vigorously dis-
tributed. 16 2 In their concurrence, Justices Ranganathan and Ahmadi
said the ChiefJustice's statement "showed that the court had applied
its mind fully to the terms of the settlement in light of the data as
153 Complying with the principles of natural justice is a requirement of the Indian
Constitution. Id. at 159.
154 Id. at 163.
15 Id. at 165-66 9, 168. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing vic-
tims' right to limited representation under the Bhopal Act).
156 Justices Ranganathan and Ahmadi did not support this part of the majority opin-
ion. They felt that the provisions for input that existed in the Act were sufficient and that
the Indian Constitution did not require any additional opportunity to be heard. Sanu v.
Union of India, No. 258, at 32 (Ranganathan and Ahmadi, JJ., concurring).
157 Id. at 172.
158 Id. at 177.
159 Id. at 178.
160 Id. at 179. The scheme adopted under the Act had no provision for judicial review.
See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
161 Sanu v. Union of India, No. 258, at 183.
162 Justice Mukharji said it is "necessary to reiterate that the promises made to the
victims and the hopes raised in their hearts and minds can only be redeemed in some
measure if attempts are made vigorously to distribute the amount realized to the victims in
accordance with the scheme [for distribution to be modified by the court]." Id. at 183.
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well as the circumstances placed before it and has been satisfied that
the settlement proposed was a fair and reasonable one that could be
approved." 63 They further said that although they were inclined to
agree with the Chief Justice, this matter was beyond the scope of the
current proceeding.164
The Indian Supreme Court has yet to decide petitions challeng-
ing the validity of the dismissal of the criminal charges' 65 and the
fairness and adequacy of the settlement.' 66 Hearings on these chal-
lenges,' 67 which began in April 1990, have not yet been concluded.
The Indian government predicts that the matter will be resolved by
March 1993.168
VIII. Political Aspects of the Case
In campaigning against the Ghandi government in 1989,
Vishwanath Pratap Singh promised to seek greater compensation
from UCC for the Bhopal victims.' 69 When elected in December
1989, he affirmed his support for further compensation from UCC,
explaining that the Ghandi government had no authority to enter a
settlement that extinguished all rights of the victims.
170
In January 1990, Prime Minister Singh strongly voiced his gov-
ernment's opposition to the Bhopal settlement reached under for-
mer Prime Minister Ghandi. He expressed: (1) support for the
petitioners challenging the settlement; (2) the intent to re-examine
criminal charges against UCC, UCIL, and its officers; and (3) harsh
rhetoric directed against UCC. Prime Minister Singh said, "My gov-
ernment has decided in principal to review the settlement and to
support petitions filed before courts by voluntary groups for its re-
view."' 7 1 He added that the government would reinstate charges of
criminal liability against UCC if the Indian Supreme Court overturns
163 Id. at 34-35 (Ranganathan and Ahmadi, JJ., concurring).
164 Id. at 36 (Ranganathan and Ahmadi, JI., concurring).
165 See supra note 142.
166 Several petitions are pending before the court. Reveiwing the Bhopal Settlement, Wall
St. J., Apr. 6, 1990, at 16, col. 5. The Indian Constitution provides for the court to review
its ruling if a petition is filed within thirty days of the ruling; however, the grounds for
reconsideration are very narrow. The Ghost Returns, FORBES, Dec. 10, 1990, at 108.
167 Reviewing the Bhopal Settlement, supra note 166. In argument before the court, an
attorney for the petitioner said the Supreme Court of India lacked the authority to order a
settlement. Bhopal Lawyer Rejects High Court on Settlement, United Press Int'l, Apr. 6, 1990.
Only the government had the authority, the lawyer asserted. Id. The lawyer also argued
that the settlement was not binding because the victims were not parties to the settlement
and that the government erred in not seeking concurrence from the victims. Id.
168 See supra note 134 (government authorizing interim compensation for three years,
in the hope that challenges to the settlement will be resolved by then).
169 Payouts in Bhopal Are Going Slowly, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1990, at A2, col. 1.
170 India Seeks to Reopen Bhopal Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1990, at Dl, col. 3.
171 Mankowski, Carbide Stock Drops on Indian Review of Bhopal Settlement, Reuter Libr.
Rep.,Jan. 22, 1990.
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the settlement."72 He commented, "Human life and criminal liability
cannot be compromised. There will be no compromise with the
crime in the settlement for compensation with the company."'"
Singh voiced even stronger language before a crowd of over
100,000 people gathered near the site of the disaster. He said that
the government had "decided to do away with the settlement and
pursue the $3 billion suit against the company."" 74 In response the
cheering crowd shouted, "death to Union Carbide."" 75 Singh said
that if the settlement were overturned, he would oppose returning
any of the $470 million settlement to UCC. 176 UCC countered that
the new government cannot disavow the settlement simply because it
disagrees with it. t7 7 Although one analyst believes that the Indian
government was merely trying to "score points" with its people, an-
other thought the matter has become a political issue in India and is
unlikely to be quickly resolved. 178 Current Indian Prime Minister
Chandra Shekhar replaced Mr. Singh in November 1990. Prime
Minister Shekhar said he will maintain the Singh government's
stance that the settlement compensation for the Bhopal victims is
inadequate. 179
IX. Can the Legal System Cope with Mass Disasters?
With the continuing litigation over the Bhopal settlement, ' 80 the
likelihood of suits against the Indian government as well as the
Madhya Pradesh state government, 181 the possibility of criminal suits
against UCC and its officials, 182 and the failure to distribute settle-
ment proceeds to the disaster victims,' 83 it is apparent that the Bho-
pal litigation is not yet over. The law should operate to compensate
victims fairly.' 8 4 If the law fails, changes must be made. 185
172 The December 22, 1989, decision held that the Act did not affect criminal charges.
However, the Attorney General maintains that the Supreme Court properly dismissed the
criminal charges. See supra note 142.
173 India May Refile Case Against Union Carbide, L.A. Times, Jan. 22, 1990, at D2, col. 3.
174 India Seeks to Reopen Bhopal Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1990, at DI, col. 3.
175 Id. In apparent response to the Prime Minister'sJanuary 21 statements, UCC stock
closed down 8%o of its value on the New York Stock Exchange on Monday, January 22,
1990. Carbide Stock Drops on Indian Review of Bhopal Settlement, Reuter Libr. Rep., Jan. 22,
1990.
176 Singh Opposes Refund to Carbide on Bhopal, United Press Int'l, Apr. 6, 1990.
177 India Seeks to Reopen Bhopal Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1990, at Dl, col. 3.
178 India: Reopen Bhopal Case, NAT'L UNDERWRITER CO. (PROP. & CASUALTY/EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS ED.), Feb. 5, 1990, at 25.
179 Indian Government Wants More Compensation for Bhopal Victims, Reuter Libr. Rep., Nov.
23, 1990.
IS0 See supra notes 165-68.
181 See supra note 150.
182 See supra note 142.
183 See supra note 13.
184 See generally Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 57 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting,
stated: "A fundamental premise of our legal system is the notion that damages are
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A. Fair Compensation of Victims
Many people recognized that the dispute between UCC and the
Indian government would be settled to avoid protracted litiga-
tion.186 While the matter was pending in United States courts, a
number of plaintiffs sought to settle with UCC for $350 million.' 8 7
The plaintiffs were represented by U.S. lawyers who are required to
act ethically and in the best interests of their clients. These lawyers
believed that this sum, minus contingency fees, was adequate com-
pensation.' 88 The final settlement of $470 million, which is higher
and does not require the subtraction of contingency fees,'8 9 is not
universally criticized and is supported by some civil rights lawyers in
India. 190
However, the adequacy of the dollar amount is not the only
characteristic of the settlement that should be examined. One com-
mentator, writing before the settlement was reached, listed six char-
acteristics of a good settlement of the matter:
1. speed
2. unnecessary transaction costs
3. resolution of all claims in India and the United States
4. fair determination of the victims' claims
5. adequate and fair compensation
6. conduct guidance (punitive effect).' 9 '
awarded to compensate the victim-to redress the injuries that he or she has actually suf-
fered") (outlines application of punitive damages).
185 One attorney, writing about the failure of the legal system to deal effectively with
the Bhopal disaster, said:
How much better it would be if next time, lawyers were able to offer an alter-
native to court systems, limited as they are by their procedures and suscepti-
ble as they are to all sorts of delays. How much better it would be if rather
than just exercising their advocacy skills after the next Bhopal, lawyers were,
before it happens, to exercise some of their other skills and serve as catalysts
for development of alternative methods to deal with such situations.
O'Keefe, Bhopal's Sorry Trail toJustice; India Interim Award Only Points Up Need for a Better Way,
L.A. Times, Jan. 11, 1988, § 2, at 7, col. 3 (emphasis in original).
186 Barr, supra note 40, at 99.
187 Snags Seen on Carbide Settlement, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at D 11, col. 1.
188 One lawyer estimated that a $300 million settlement would have provided com-
pensation of $15,000 for the death of a breadwinner, $8,000 for the death of a non-bread-
winner, $12,000 for a disabled breadwinner, and $5,000 for other injuries with a long-term
effect. Magraw, The Bhopal Disaster: Structuring a Solution, 57 U. CoLo. L. REV. 835 (1986).
Fifteen thousand dollars in the bank at ten percent interest would provide a monthly in-
come of one hundred and twenty-five dollars. Id. The average Indian worker makes fifty
U.S. dollars per month. Court Orders $60 Payment to Bhopal Victims, United Press Int'l, Aug.
5, 1989.
189 The Bhopal Act provides for the deduction of administrative costs. However, the
Indian Attorney General asserted in proceedings before the Supreme Court in early 1990
that the government will not seek any portion of the $470 million settlement as reimburse-
ment for sums already expended for disaster relief. Sanu v. Union of India, No. 258, at
111 (India Dec. 22, 1989) (writ petition).
190 See supra note 120.
191 Magraw, supra note 188, at 841-43.
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The settlement meets few of these criteria.
Speed. The settlement was painfully slow. The parties took more
than four years to reach a settlement and now, more than six years
after the disaster, the settlement funds remain undistributed.t 92
Unnecessary Transaction Costs. This aspect of the settlement has
been favorable to the victims-unnecessary transaction costs 93 seem
to have been avoided. Not paying contingent attorney fees to the
lawyers of the individual Bhopal victims was a great savings. Further,
although the Indian government's administration of the matter has
already cost more than $60 million,1 9 4 India has indicated that it will
not reduce the settlement fund by the sums it had already paid as of
December 1989.195
Resolution of All Claims. The settlement has not resolved all
claims in the United States and India. Further challenges are pend-
ing in India' 96 and further litigation is likely in the United States. 197
Fair Determination of Victims' Claims. The Indian government has
established a process to determine the victims' claims. The govern-
ment plans to set up fifty-six special courts to disburse the money
and designate seven judges to hear appeals.' 98 An independent
"watchdog" group will monitor the disbursement.' 99 However, crit-
icism of this program is rampant, and there is great fear that the
claims will not be determined properly. 200 Experts anticipate that
192 See supra notes 13 (settlement funds remain undistributed) and 138 (progress in
government's distribution of stop-gap compensation to victims).
193 Magraw defined unnecessary transaction costs primarily as legal fees and other
expenses. Magraw, supra note 188, at 842.
194 See supra note 40. Interestingly though, an anthropologist hired by UCC to analyze
payments from a settlement fund found the Indian government needed to be involved to
effectively distribute the fund. Judge Skeptical on Bhopal Proposal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1986,
at A28, col. 3.
195 See supra note 189.
196 See supra notes 142 (possible future criminal suits), 150 (possible future claims
against the government), 166-68 (current challenges to the settlement), 169-79 (govern-
ment support for challenges to the settlement), infra note 197 (possible future lawsuits in
the United States).
197 At least two plaintiffs' attorneys say a number of cases will be pursued in the
United States. Blum, Doubts Remain, the Bhopal Litigation May Linger, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 27,
1989, at 3. The Texas Supreme Court recently upheld a trial court's refusal to dismiss a
suit by non-citizens injured by chemicals outside of the United States on the basis of forum
non conveniens. Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990). Justice Gon-
zales, in his dissent, said the majority opinion opened the door to an influx of Bhopal-type
litigation. Id. at 690 (Gonzales, J., dissenting). Several lawyers for Bhopal plaintiffs noted
that UCC has facilities in Texas and said they may now be able to sue UCC in Texas. Texas
Courts Opened to Foreign Damage Cases, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1990, at B6, col. 3. In May 1990,
Indian Attorney General Soli Sorabji travelled to the United States to explore possible
legal actions against UCC. Indian Attorney General to Visit U.S. in Connection with Bhopal Case,
United Press Int'l, May 9, 1990.
198 India's Bhopal Victims Lose Out in Legal Wrangling, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 24,
1989, at 3, col. 2.
199 Id.
200 Blum, supra note 14, at 3, 26. Stanley Chesley, former lead plaintiff's attorney, felt
the money should have gone directly to the plaintiffs. John Coale said that the problem is
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many slightly or moderately injured victims will not be properly
compensated because, in the post disaster confusion, India kept poor
records of those treated. 20' Furthermore, allegations of corruption
have surfaced. One Indian woman, whose two children died shortly
after birth, asked officials for an autopsy so that she could prove their
cause of death, but, she said, "They wanted a bribe. I had no money.
Nothing. Not even enough to buy a shroud." 202
The government's recent decision to make payments to 500,000
people who were exposed to the gas further muddies the waters.
Previous estimates of the number of injured were much lower.203
The government has retained the right to "adjust" the estimated
$212 million cost of the payments against the compensation the vic-
tims may receive through the lawsuit. 204 It is unclear whether the
"adjustment" will apply only to those who recover under the
scheme, or whether the total sum will be charged against the settle-
ment. It is also unclear if the desire to accomplish this "adjustment"
will influence the government's administration of the scheme. The
questions raised about the fair determination of the victims' claims
will not be fully answered until the government distributes the settle-
ment money.
Adequate and Fair Compensation. The question remains whether
the settlement will compensate the victims fairly. The Indian gov-
ernment indicated that about $12,000 would be paid for death or
permanent disability. 205 At the time, this sum was almost three times
higher than the amount awarded to victims in motor vehicle accident
cases in India. 206 Some Bhopal residents interviewed in 1989 felt
that the sum would be adequate. Others certainly must have felt that
no money could compensate them for what they had suffered and
lost. One advocacy group estimates that the total recovery by United
the Indian government and doubts that the victims will receive their compensation. Id.
But see supra note 194 (UCC expert says Indian Government must be involved to fairly
distribute the settlement).
201 Indian Town Agonizes in 5th Year Since Gas Leak, Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1989, at A34.
202 Id.
203 The Indian Supreme Court, in its December 22, 1989, decision, referred to figures
recited by Justice Seth in his earlier opinion to estimate 3,000 had died and 30,000 were
seriously injured. Sanu v. Union of India, No. 258, at 117 (India Dec. 22, 1989) (writ
petition). A frequently recited figure for the number injured had been 200,000. In re
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) aff'd as
modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987). See supra note 201. Even
a Bhopal victims advocacy group, Bhopal Justice Campaign, used a figure of 260,000 in-
jured. Five Years On, Bhopal Victims Hear They Will Soon Receive Relief, Fin. Times, Mar. 6,
1990, § 1, at 4.
204 United Press International, referring to the statement of an Indian government
official, reported: "He said .. .the payment would later be adjusted against the final com-
pensation which the victims may get through pending lawsuits." India to Pay Interim Bhopal
Relief, United Press Int'l, Mar. 5, 1990.
205 Barr, supra note 40, at 100.
206 Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India, No. 13080, at 15 (India 1988) (special
leave petition).
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States standards would have been $35 billion. 20 7 Raising the ques-
tion of whether the settlement will even cover the medical costs of
the victims, one victims' advocacy group estimated that health care
alone will cost $4.6 billion.
208
Conduct Guidance (Punitive Effect). As the settlement appears to
have had little punitive effect on UCC, its conduct guidance 20 9 is
questionable. After accounting for insurance coverage, UCC's actual
accrued liability for the disaster was $237 million.210 UCC's world-
wide profit for 1988, after adjusting for the settlement payment, was
$662 million. 21' UCC's worldwide profit for 1989, despite debt and
structural problems, was $573 million. 212 Although the Bhopal liti-
gation must have been unpleasant for UCC, 213 the payment was less
than one-half of its 1988 profit. In the days following the settlement,
UCC stock prices increased, 2 14 and UCIL considered expanding its
operations. 2
1 5
Of the six characteristics of a good settlement, only one has
been met. Clearly, the law has fallen short in dealing with the Bho-
pal disaster. More than six years after the Bhopal disaster, the vic-
tims remain largely uncompensated, the legal wrangling continues,
and unfortunately, the matter is far from over. The lessons learned
from the Bhopal matter should be acted upon now; states and enter-
prises should develop an efficient legal procedure to cope with fu-
ture disasters and strengthen prevention and emergency responses.
B. Planning for the Future
When the Indian Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Bhopal Act, the Justices recommended adopting legislation to
prepare for future disasters. Chief Justice Mukharji advocated a
stricter licensing and authorization procedure that requires the es-
tablishment of a fund to compensate disaster victims and requires
207 Bhopal Justice Campaign estimated the recovery of the estimated 260,000 victims,
by United States standards, would be about $35 billion. Five Years On, Bhopal Victims Hear
They Will Soon Receive Relief, Fin. Times, Mar. 6, 1990, § 1, at 4.
208 Bhopal Justice Campaign, a Santa-Monica-based advocate for the Bhopal victims,
made the estimate. Blum, supra note 14.
209 Magraw defined "conduct guidance" as incentives for more careful behavior.
Magraw, supra note 188, at 843.
210 Barr, supra note 40, at 105.
211 Carbide Accounts for Bhopal, Chemical Week, Mar. 1, 1989, at 7.
212 Earnings, L.A. Times, Jan. 26, 1990, at D12, col. 2.
213 After the disaster, UCC stock prices dropped dramatically and a corporate raider
tried to take over the company. UCC had to sell some of its most profitable subsidiaries
and assume a large debt to avoid the takeover attempt. Settlement Won't Hurt Carbide; In-
surer, Fund Will Pay Most of Costs, Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 1989, at D4.
214 Union Carbide shares rose more than two dollars on the New York Stock Exchange
after the settlement was announced. Carbide Comes Outfrom Under its Cloud, 10 PORTFOLIO
LETrER 2 (Feb. 20, 1989).
215 UCIL also reported the controversy had not hurt the sale of its products in India.
Tarrant, Bhopal Victims to Get Income for Life, India Says, Reuter Libr. Rep., Feb. 23, 1989.
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industries to submit such disputes to arbitration. 21 6 He also called
for statutorily fixing the basis for damages and providing for punitive
damages. 2
1 7
Justices Ranganathan and Ahmadi2 18 similarly suggested adopt-
ing legislation that provides some readiness for similar occurrences
in the future. At a minimum, they suggested, the law should provide
for: (1) paying fixed minimum compensation on a no-fault basis
pending final adjudication of the claim; (2) creating a special forum
with specific powers to grant interim relief in appropriate cases; (3)
developing a procedure in the special forum to expeditiously resolve
claims and avoid the formalism of regular courts; and (4) requiring
industries to insure themselves against third party risks.219 They
also supported the formation of an industrial disaster fund to imme-
diately assist disaster victims, as suggested by Justice Singh, 220 and
called for the adoption of an international code to address industrial
disasters when they occur in the future.22' Justice Singh called at-
tention to the Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations
drafted by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.
He said that India had adopted the Code,222 and that the govern-
ment should take measures to legislatively adopt the protections
provided.22 3
The Indian Supreme Court recognized that the current system
of dealing with large-scale industrial disasters is inadequate. As the
court suggested in part, in addition to efforts to prevent future disas-
ters, states should also consider the following approaches: (1) inter-
national conventions; (2) contractual provisions entered into
between the state and the enterprise; and (3) national legislation.2 2
4
Although each of the three approaches has strengths and weak-
nesses, none should be ignored. Each approach should be incorpo-
rated into a comprehensive scheme.
The United Nations Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational
216 Sanu v. Union of India, No. 258, at 184-85 (India Dec. 22, 1989) (writ petition).
217 Id.
218 In India, the Supreme Court decides by a majority. S. DHYANI, JURISPRUDENCE, A
STUDY OF INDIAN LEGAL THEORY (2d ed. 1978).
219 Sanu v. Union of India, No. 258, at 39-40 (India Dec. 22, 1989) (writ petition)
(Ranganathan and Ahmadi, JJ., concurring).
220 Id. at 10-11 (Singh, J., concurring).
221 Id. at 40-43 (Ranganathan and Ahmadi, Jj., concurring).
222 Justice Singh said, "The Code was adopted in 1986 to which a large number of
countries of the world are signatories. Although it has not been fully finalized yet.[sic]"
Id. at 7 (Singh, J., concurring). In fact the Code, which has been in draft form for more
than 14 years, still has not been adopted by the United Nations. Draft U.N. Code of Conduct
for Companies Needs to be More 'Balanced,' U.S. Aid Says, Daily Report for Executives (BNA)
No. 208, at A-I I (Oct. 26, 1990).
223 Sanu v. Union of India, No. 258, at 7.
224 McCaffrey, Expediting the Provision of Compensation to Accident Victims, in TRANSFERRING
HAZARDOUS TECHNOLOGIES AND SUBSTANCES 199 (Handl & Lutz ed. 1990).
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Corporations 225 is an example of an international convention that
should be considered. 226 Work on the Code was begun before the
Bhopal disaster.227 The Code requires transnational corporations to
carry out their operations in accordance with national laws as well as
to "perform their activities with due regard to relevant international
standards, so they do not endanger the health or safety of consum-
ers." 228 A similar rule is applied for environmental protection, and
in addition, the transnational coproration must inform the national
government of any aspect of its product that may harm the environ-
ment, and of environmental restrictions placed on the multinational
in other countries. 229 Similarly, the multinational must disclose the
characteristics of the product that may be harmful to the health and
safety of consumers and must disclose the health and safety regula-
tions imposed upon it by other countries. 230 However, the Code
lacks provisions to create a fund to compensate those injured by the
multinational, to hold the parent corporation liable for the acts of its
subsidiary, or to resolve conflicts quickly and deliver compensation
to victims without resorting to a lengthy judicial process. The Code
has been ready for a number of years, yet, despite its mild require-
ments of notice and information and its failure to tackle tougher is-
sues such as jurisdiction, liability, and compensation, it has not been
adopted. Even if the Code were in effect in India at the time of the
Bhopal disaster, and UCC had followed its provisions, the problem
of the egregiously slow delivery of compensation to the disaster vic-
tims would not have changed.
Contractual provisions can be more far-reaching. Contractual
provisions could be used when the multinational enterprise contracts
directly with the state to build or operate an industry. If the state is
not a party to the contract, national law could require that certain
provisions be included in the contract. However, contractual provi-
sions, and laws requiring them, would have little effect on industries
that have already been established.
National legislation, on the other hand, has the potential to be
adopted quickly and would apply to existing and future industries.
Laws that are too one-sided or extreme, which could drive industries
225 Outstanding Issues in the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations,
May 29, 1984, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1984/S/5 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 602 (1984)[here-
inafter Draft Code].
226 Conventions with a more narrow scope have been successfully adopted. For exam-
ple, the 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships provides
for absolute liability for damage caused by nuclear incidents involving a ship, to a limit of
1500 million francs. SURVEY OF STATE PRACTICE RELEVANT TO INTERNATIONAL LIABILrrY
FOR INJURIOUS CONSEQUENCES ARISING OUT OF ACTS NOT PROHIBITED BY INTERNATIONAL
LAw, Agenda Item IV at 211, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/15 (1984).
227 See Draft Code, supra note 225, 23 I.L.M. at 605.
228 Id. at 632.
229 Id. at 633.
230 Id. at 632.
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from the country, may be characterized as a nationalization. How-
ever, carefully drafted laws could be effective in more adequately
preparing for future disasters.231
Under each element of the scheme, the questions ofjurisdiction,
consolidation of claims, interim relief, liability, establishment of a
compensation fund, forum and process for speedy resolution, en-
forceability, and distribution of compensation should be considered.
The parties could agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of
the courts of the host country, the country providing the technology,
or a special forum. This would avoid delays such as the two years it
took in the Bhopal matter to establish that jurisdiction in the Ameri-
can courts was improper. A process for consolidation of claims
should also be developed and tested before the occurrence of a dis-
aster. The parties could agree in advance to the adoption of an act
such as the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act, if such acts were author-
ized under the law of the host country. If possible, the act could be
tested in a declaratory action to avoid the delays incurred by the
adoption and later litigation of the act's constitutionality, such as oc-
curred in the Bhopal case.
23 2
A relief fund, such as that suggested by Justice Singh, 2 "3 could
be funded by individual industries, by all industries operating in the
country, or with the proceeds of nationally mandated insurance poli-
cies. In conjunction with a relief fund, emergency relief could be
made available almost immediately to victims of a disaster.23 4 A pro-
cess for distributing the proceeds of the fund should also be estab-
lished and debated in advance. This would help avoid later legal
wrangling about the process of distribution and would give victims
notice of how to preserve evidence relevant to their claims.
A set liability figure, or a minimum liability figure, should also
be considered. A corporation may be willing to agree to limited lia-
bility rather than risk being excluded from the country or facing an
unknown higher liability in the event of a disaster.23 5 Trading po-
231 For example, Japanese law mandates a compensation fund paid for by nuclear in-
dustries. The nuclear operator has an absolute and unlimited obligation to pay compensa-
tion for a nuclear accident. However, if the damages exceed the amount of the fund, the
government will pay the balance. Japanese AEC Revises Nuclear Compensation Law, NUCLEON-
ICS WEEK, Dec. 15, 1988, at 12. The United States has national legislation regulating the
nuclear industry which is not as far reaching as Japan's, but which simplifies establishing
an operator's liability and requires a fund to pay damages. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2210 (West 1973
& Supp. 1990). See Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation?-The Sixty-
Three Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVTrL. L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing whether 42
U.S.C.A. § 2210 can serve as a model for compensation legislation).
232 The Indian government adopted the Bhopal Act in March, 1985. Sanu v. Union of
India, No. 258, at 15 (India Dec. 22, 1989) (writ petition). The Indian Supreme Court
held the Act constitutional in December 1989. Id.
233 See supra note 220.
234 See McCaffrey, supra note 224, at 221.
235 Id.
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tentially high compensation for certain and immediate relief may be
agreeable and beneficial to both the state and the enterprise. For
example, a multinational such as UCC, whose continued existence
was questioned during the pre-settlement days of the Bhopal mat-
ter,236 might agree to a fixed and certain liability in anticipation of a
disaster rather than face the uncertainty of limitless liability after a
disaster. The state would also benefit by having money readily avail-
able to compensate disaster victims.
A special forum responsible for quickly resolving the matter
should also be designated. This would avoid long delays if the entire
matter were litigated. Litigation of the entire Bhopal case would
have taken twenty years. 237 United States District Judge Jack Wein-
stein has called for establishing "disaster courts" which could quickly
and effectively deal with claims arising from a mass disaster.2 38
Designating a forum charged with dealing exclusively with the matter
would speed up the currently egregiously slow process of providing
compensation to mass disaster victims.
The parties could also agree to provisions for insurance to cover
eventual liability, and for enforcement in the parent corporation's
home country of a decision reached in an agreed-upon process. The
parties should also negotiate in advance the parent corporation's lia-
bility where the subsidiary's assets or insurance cannot meet poten-
tial liability.
X. Conclusion
The overriding consideration in developing a comprehensive
scheme to deal with large-scale industrial disasters should be adopt-
ing strategies to quickly compensate the victims. The Bhopal disas-
ter litigation has already lasted more than six years, and it is not over
yet. The victims remain largely uncompensated, and none of the set-
tlement money has been distributed. In this matter, the law has
failed to provide prompt and fair compensation to the victims. The
hard lesson learned from the Bhopal disaster is that such disasters
must be anticipated. This lesson should lead states and enterprises
to begin preparing for such eventualities now. The legal strategies
that states must consider include international conventions, contrac-
tual provisions between the state and enterprise, and national legis-
236 A few weeks after the disaster, Business Week noted that UCC's stock dropped
twenty-seven percent of its value after the disaster, a loss of almost $1 billion. Dobrzynski,
Union Carbide Fights for its Life, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 24, 1984, at 52. The article drew parallels
between the UCC Bhopal disaster and the asbestos litigation which drove the Mansville
Corporation into bankruptcy. Id. Time magazine said the litigation could endanger
UCC's financial future. A Calamity for Union Carbide; The Financial Future of the Chemical Giant
is in Question, TIME, Dec. 17, 1984, at 38.
237 Settlement is Reached on Bhopal, Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 1989, at Al, col. 3.
238 Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reactions to Disasters, 11 COLUM. J.
ENVrL. L. 1 (1986).
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lation. The scheme adopted should provide quick and fair
compensation to disaster victims.

